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In tro d u c tio n
This working paper analyses the roots for the widely recognised 
“implementation gap” of European legislation. Even though implementation 
failures are feared to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the integration 
process (Commission 1996; Ehlermann 1996), solutions seem difficult to find. 
We focus our investigation on the primary implementing actors, namely 
national administrations and take as our starting point that their implementation 
performance is shaped by the existing administrative traditions, which may 
differ substantially from country to country (Siedentopf/Ziller 1988; 
Siedentopf/Hauschild 1990, 451; Dehousse et al. 1992; Metcalfe 1994). We ask 
how do national administrative arrangements affect the implementation 
performance and under what conditions is the implementation of EU legislation 
likely to be most effective.
We define implementation effectiveness as the degree to which both the formal 
transposition and the practical application of supranational measures at the 
national level correspond to the objectives defined in the European legislation1. 
Hence, it is the compliance with these objectives rather than political outcomes 
in terms of environmental quality improvements that concern us here. Our focus 
on the impact of institutional structures and on their ability to adapt to European 
requirements distinguishes this research from a classical implementation study.
The implementation of EU environmental policy in Britain and Germany 
constitutes the empirical focus of this analysis. Environmental policy is an area 
where implementation gaps are particularly prevalent (Commission 1996); the 
selection of Britain nd Germany allows us to assess the role of national 
administrative arrangements in a comparative fashion as these arrangements are 
diametrically opposed in the two selected countries (cf. Heritier/Knill/Mingers 
1996). To support our research design we have chosen five pieces of EU 
environmental legislation that correspond with either the German or the British 
patterns more closely. Assuming that implementation effectiveness increases 
with the degree of compatibility of EU legislation with national arrangements 
we therefore expect that effective implementation of a certain policy in one 
country will be paralleled by an ineffective record in the other.
As we will see, empirical evidence reveals surprising results conflicting with 
this initial hypothesis. Therefore, we will further develop our explanatory
1 Although practical application is the most important factor when deciding upon 
effectiveness of implementation, formal transposition is taken into account, as it forms the 



























































































framework by introducing the concept of perception and by adopting a dynamic 
institutional perspective. We conclude with a typology of four implementation 
paths, implying either effective or ineffective performance in the context of 
differently perceived adaptation pressures.
1 The Factual Constellation of European Requirements and National 
Administrative Arrangements
As a starting point for our analysis of the implementation effectiveness in 
Germany and the UK, we introduce the “intuitive” hypothesis that the 
implementation performance is directly linked to the ’’match” or ’’mismatch” 
between European policy requirements and existing arrangements at the 
national level. This expectation corresponds to the insights gained in the neo- 
institutional literature which concludes that institutions do not automatically 
adapt to exogenous pressure, but resist change although their environment may 
be changing (Krasner 1988; DiMaggio/Powell 1991; March/Olsen 1996). 
Accordingly, implementation effectiveness of EU policies is expected to be low 
if the number of institutional adaptations required at the national level is high. 
As the flip-side of the coin, we assume effective implementation, when EU 
policy is corresponding to national patterns; i.e. if compliance with EU 
provisions is possible without institutional adaptations at the national level.
In order to test this initial hypothesis, we characterise the constellations of the 
German and British national administrative arrangements and the requirements 
of the European measures under study and address the objective (factual) 
differences between national and European patterns. We assess the soundness 
of our explanatory model by contrasting the actual implementation outcomes 
with our expectations based on this comparison of factual constellations.
1.1 Contrasting Patterns: German and British Administrative Arrangements 
in Environmental Policy
To assess the objective ’’match” or ’’mismatch” of European legislation and 
national administrative traditions, we distinguish three analytical dimensions 
characterising sectoral administrative arrangements: regulatory approach, style, 
and structures. The regulatory approach refers to dominant ideas and beliefs of 
how to tackle certain policy problems (Hall 1993). The dimension of the 
regulatory style is defined by two related aspects: the mode of state intervention 
and administrative interest intermediation; i.e. patterns of interaction between 
administrative and societal actors. From an analytical perspective, we can 




























































































regulatory style. The mediating ideal is characterised by a form of state 
intervention that emphasises self-regulation and procedural rather than 
substantive requirements; it implies high discretion and flexibility with respect 
to practical application. Accordingly, patterns of interest intermediation are 
shaped by pragmatic bargaining, informality, consensus, and transparency. 
Following the interventionist ideal, on the other hand, command-and-control 
type regulatory rules define substantive objectives, leaving administrative actors 
only limited discretion and flexibility for defining requirements taking into 
consideration individual circumstances. As a consequence, we expect patterns 
of interest intermediation to be more legalistic, formal, adversarial and closed 
(i.e. with limited access for third parties) (cf. van Waarden 1995). As a third 
dimension, regulatory structures are of relevance. Relevant patterns in this 
context are related to both the vertical (centralisation/decentralisation) and 
horizontal (concentration/fragmentation) distribution of administrative 
competencies as well as patterns of administrative coordination and control.
A comparison of German and British arrangements in environmental policy 
along these three dimensions reveals a picture of rather opposing national 
characteristics. To begin with the regulatory approach, the German concept can 
be summarised as precautionary, technology oriented, and emission-based. 
Based on the principle of precaution, German environmental regulation makes 
use of the best available technologies (BAT) in striving to reduce pollution as 
far as possible. BAT is employed despite scientific uncertainty with respect to 
the actual harmful effects of polluting substances. Technology orientation and 
precaution imply the definition of uniform control requirements throughout the 
country, independent of varying local conditions. This problem solving 
"philosophy" stands in sharp contrast to the British regulatory approach. Instead 
of precautionary action, the British require sound scientific evidence on harmful 
effects of pollutants as the basic condition for regulatory intervention. 
Accordingly, pollution is not reduced at any cost, but by balancing potential 
benefits for human health and the environment against the economic cost of 
control technologies. Moreover, control requirements are not defined in uniform 
manner but by taking account of varying local conditions (cf. Boehmer- 
Christiansen/Skea 1991; Weale 1992; Heritier/Knill/Mingers 1996; Lenschow 
1997; Knill 1995; 1997).
The contrast between the British and German regulatory approach can also be 
identified when the dominant regulatory styles are considered. This holds true 
for both the mode of state intervention and patterns of administrative interest 
intermediation. The regulatory style in Germany to a large extent reflects the 
interventionist ideal type. Policy instruments are generally characterised by a 




























































































standards to be achieved by industry, leaving limited room for flexible 
adaptations of control requirements in the context of local circumstances. 
Accordingly, patterns of interest intermediation can be described as being rather 
formal and legalistic, with informal bargaining between regulatory authorities 
and industry taking place under the ’’shadow of the law". Access for third 
parties is quite restricted, allowing for participation only in legally specified 
cases (Winter 1996, Lenschow 1997).
In Britain, by contrast, the traditional regulatory style corresponds to the 
mediating rather than intervening type. I.e., the UK has a preference for flexible 
policy instruments which leave great leeway and discretion for adapting to local 
circumstances. Thus, in water and air regulations, no legally binding quality or 
emission standards have been in place for a long time. Rather the emphasis is on 
individual negotiations between the regulating authorities and industry in light 
of the particular situation given with respect to environmental quality, available 
technology and economic situation of the company. Procedural aspects of 
balancing these different criteria are more important than substantive provisions 
with respect to emission or quality values. The specific type of instruments 
preferred implies distinctive patterns of administrative interest intermediation, 
favouring pragmatic rather than legalistic styles of interaction characterised by 
consensual and informal relationships between public authorities and the 
regulated industry. Furthermore, transparency of the consensual bargaining is 
low in order not to jeopardise the rather ’’chummy” and ’’cosy” relationships. 
Consequently, opportunities for third parties such as environmental 
organisations to participate in the authorisation process are rather limited 
(Vogel 1986; Jordan 1993; Knill 1995).
In addition, fundamental differences between German and British 
administrative arrangements exist with respect to the regulatory structure. In 
Germany, sectoral structure is characterised by a high degree of decentralisation 
and fragmentation. Decentralisation can be traced to the federal structure of the 
state, implying a functional division of competencies between the federal level 
(policy formulation) and the regional level (implementation and practical 
application). At the regional or Lander level, there exists a multi-tier 
organisational hierarchy, including local districts and councils. The high degree 
of administrative fragmentation becomes evident in the medium-specific 
administrative processing given in environmental regulation (Pfeiffer 1991).
While fragmentation of administrative competencies also used to be a typical 
feature of the British arrangements, the main responsibilities for policy 
implementation lie with the central level. In contrast to Germany, the 




























































































only with respect to policy formulation, but also for implementation. In this 
context, the DoE delegated implementation competencies to a whole range of 
different inspectorates and authorities at the central and local level. Contrasting 
with the functional division of responsibilities in Germany the division of 
competencies between the central and local level is based on sectoral criteria, 
with both levels fulfilling their tasks rather independent from each other; i.e. 
there is no hierarchical control or inspection of local authorities’ day-to-day 
activities by central government, implying high variation of local authority 
performance throughout the country (Steel 1979, 34; Knoepfel/Weidner 1985; 
Weale 1996, 127f.).
Table 1: German and British Administrative Tradition in Environmental Policy
Germany Britain
Regulatory Approach precautionary - sound scientific evidence
technology-oriented - cost/benefit calculations
- emission-based - local quality
Regulatory Style "Interventionist Ideal" "Mediating Ideal"
State Intervention hierarchical more self-regulation
substantive procedural
- low flexibility/discretion - high flexibility/discretion
Adm. Interest formal informal
Intermediation legalistic pragmatic
more adversarial consensual
- closed - closed
Regulatory Structure - functional decentralisation - sectoral decentralisation
sectoral fragmentation - sectoral fragmentation
- hierarchical coordination lacking hierarchical 
coordination of local 
activities
1.2 The Policies under Investigation
Having elaborated on the contrasting regulatory approaches, styles, and 
structures given in British and German environmental policy, we now take a 
closer look at the adaptation requirements which the selected European policies 
imply for the differing national arrangements. Regulatory implications, though 
not necessarily along all three dimensions, are transmitted via the policy 
instruments defined in respective EU legislation; the employment of these EU 
policy instruments may have more or less fundamental repercussions on well- 
established regulatory arrangements at the national level. The following table 
summarises the expectations regarding regulatory approach, style and structure 




























































































Table 2: Administrative Implications of the Policies under Study


















Intervention Type: neutral, organisational 
hierarchical, uniform, rather than structural 




Access to Intervention Type: neutral, organisational
Informatio procedural rather than structural
n Interest Intermediation: implications 
transparency
EIA integrated Intervention Type: concentration and 
hierarchical, coordination of 





Eco-Audit Intervention Type: building up new 
self-regulation, administrative 
procedural, high structures 
flexibility
To elaborate briefly, only the LCP, the Drinking Water and the EIA Directives 
affect the dimension of regulatory approach. The former two emphasise the 
precautionary principle and the use of the best available technologies (cf. 
Knill/Heritier 1996; Knill 1997b, 51). Based on these principles, the focus of 
the LCP-Directive is directed at the reduction of emissions at the end of the 
pipe, whilst the Drinking Water Directive focuses on water quality objectives. 
In contrast, the EIA Directive is characterised by an integrated philosophy, 
calling for the assessment of environmental impacts for any project that is likely 
to have such impact from a cross-media perspective.
Different conceptions shape EU legislation also with respect to regulatory 
styles. Whereas the LCP and Drinking Water Directive reflect the 
interventionist ideal type, the Information Directive and the Eco-Audit 




























































































between these two poles. The interventionist character of the LCP and Drinking 
Water Directives becomes apparent in the substantive and hierarchical 
instruments, which define emission or quality standards. Thus, the LCP 
Directive defines legally binding emission standards for dust, NOx and S02 for 
all new plants (entering operation after 1.7.1987). Moreover, emissions from 
old plants had to be reduced in the context of differentiated national 
requirements. In the latter case, member states have certain flexibility in 
deciding on relevant means for achieving the national ’’bubble” targets. The 
Drinking Water Directive binds member states to be in compliance with defined 
guide values and mandatory values (maximum admissible concentration and 
minimum required concentration) regarding a range of parameters linked to 
water for human consumption (Haigh 1996). These uniform and hierarchical 
specifications imply quite formal and legalistic patterns of administrative 
interest intermediation.
In contrast, the Information Directive is characterised by procedural 
requirements aiming at increasing regulatory transparency. To make the 
performance of both public authorities and the regulated industries accountable 
to the public, the Directive requires relevant authorities holding information on 
the environment to make this information available to the persons requesting it. 
The mediating regulatory style is even more pronounced in the case of the Eco- 
Audit Regulation, which emphasises industrial self-regulation by the voluntary 
introduction of an environmental management system. The EIA Directive, on 
the other hand, is characterised by both mediating and interventionist elements. 
While the requirement to carry out an EIA is specified in a hierarchical way, the 
Directive’s focus on procedural aspects and public participation reflects 
elements of the mediating ideal type.
When focusing on structural arrangements, potential implications exist 
primarily in case of the EIA Directive and the Eco-Audit Regulation. Thus, the 
integrated approach inherent to the EIA procedure points to the concentration or 
at least coordination of administrative control responsibilities. While the EIA 
Directive may imply changes in existing structures, the Eco-Audit Regulation 
requires to build up new structures. Member states must create competent 
Accreditation and certification bodies in order to set up an Environmental 
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) to be applied by industry. Structural 
implications of the other Directives, in contrast, seem less demanding.
1.3 The Constellation of EU Policies and National Arrangements: 
Assumptions and Empirical Evidence
Given the administrative implications of the European legislation under study 




























































































could expect a bifurcation of implementation results for each country. In 
Germany, we assume effective results for the Directives on LCP and Drinking 
Water, which basically correspond to national administrative characteristics. In 
contrast, the British implementation record with respect to these measures is 
likely to be rather ineffective, since both the national regulatory approach and 
style differ from the EU provisions. On the other hand, we expect effective 
implementation in the UK for the Eco-Audit Regulation and the EIA Directive. 
Both pieces of legislation demand far-reaching adaptation for the regulatory 
style and structure given in Germany, however, suggesting ineffective 
implementation results here. The Directive on Access to Information is the only 
legislation, where we expect similar implementation problems in both countries, 
since the European provisions require changes in the rather secretive 
administrative practice given in both Germany and Britain.
When comparing these initial hypotheses with empirical evidence on the 
implementation of the five policies under study, we find rather puzzling and 
surprising results. In Germany three cases confirm our expectations; in Britain 
only one case corresponds with our hypotheses.
Beginning with Germany, empirical evidence on the LCP Directive confirms 
our hypothesis of effective implementation results. The LCP Directive was 
complied with without involving changes to the domestic regulatory approach, 
style or structure. Only with respect to EU reporting requirements, Germany is 
struggling to meet its obligations (Lenschow 1997). The Drinking Water 
Directive, on the other hand, where we would have expected an “easy” 
implementation record revealed surprising problems visible in a much delayed 
formal transposition of the Directive (see below).
Our expectations regarding implementation problems in Germany are supported 
in two out of three cases. With respect to the EIA, several legal proceedings 
suggest that Germany has exploited legal ambiguity in the Directive with 
restrictive implementation. The EIA was integrated into existing authorisation 
procedures without adopting an integrative approach which would have implied 
an overhaul of administrative structures. In a similar way, the Information 
Directive was implemented in a very restrictive manner fundamentally reducing 
the objectives defined in European legislation (Lenschow 1997). Germany’s 
actual implementing performance reflects resistance on the administrative level 
(aside from coordination problems between the federal and state levels resulting 
in the delayed transposition of the Directive). The German expert committee for 
the environment (Sachverstandigenrat fur Umwelt, SRU 1996) criticised the 
narrow interpretation of the public bodies obligated to provide free access to 




























































































provisions regarding the form in which access is to be provided, the broad 
interpretation of the exemption clauses included in the Directive, and the 
implementation of the provision that public authorities are entitled to charge for 
responding to an information request.
Similar to the EIA and the Information Directives, the Eco-Audit Regulation, 
with its voluntary and self-regulatory elements, contradicts the prevailing 
interventionist and legalistic regulatory style in Germany. Against this 
background, the emergence of Germany as the "European champion" in 
implementing EMAS is rather surprising. By November 1996 there were almost 
350 registered sites, compared to the “runner up” Austria with more than 30 
sites (Drezet 1996, cited in Bouma 1996). Our general hypothesis obviously is 
not sufficient to account for the German experience in the case of the EMAS 
Regulation.
The insufficiency of the explanatory framework developed so far becomes even 
more evident when considering the British case, where only the effective 
implementation of the EMAS Regulation corresponds to our expectations. 
EMAS is compatible with the British preference for self-regulation and 
procedural instruments and was integrated in the already existing structures 
relatively smoothly. With respect to all other measures under investigation, 
empirical evidence in Britain contradicts our initial hypothesis, however.
Firstly, the implementation record of the EIA Directive is quite ineffective, 
although its procedural character as well as its structural requirements seemed 
to imply no particular adaptation problems for the British. European 
requirements were integrated into the planning procedures which fall under the 
responsibility of the local authorities. This integration without change, however, 
to some extent runs against the objectives of the Directive. Firstly, due to the 
lack of coordination between central and local authorities given within the 
British political system, there is no linkage between the EIA (where 
responsibility lies with the local level) and the industrial process authorisation 
(which for the larger plants lies with the Environment Agency) (Knill 1997a). 
Secondly, as a result of the ’’easy" implementation, environmental impacts are 
given no particular rank compared to other considerations in the planning 
process. In light of the wide discretion traditionally given to the planning 
authorities, the latter have broad leeway in balancing the results of the EIA 
against other information to be considered, such as financial and economic 
interests. Moreover, the balancing of competing considerations is only to a 
limited extent subject to court review. The courts only review the procedural 
aspects, e.g. if all interests have been taken into account, but leave the concrete 




























































































of environmental statements in general is therefore not very satisfactory. Some 
provide only little more information than a standard planning application, and 
few provide information on the alternatives considered, or the mutual 
interaction of the effects on different environmental media.
The second surprise to be found with respect to the British case is the fact that 
the implementation of the Directives on LCP, Drinking Water and Access to 
Information reveals quite effective results, although these measures required 
far-reaching adaptations of the existing regulatory approach and style. In the 
LCP and Drinking Water case, despite initial resistance far-reaching 
administrative changes have taken place, including a more substantive 
orientation with respect to state intervention and a tendency toward formal and 
legalistic patterns of administrative interest intermediation. Given these 
adaptations, the substantive objectives defined in the two Directives are 
basically achieved, implying fundamental quality improvements as a result of 
significant investment programmes in order to meet the EU requirements 
(Maloney/Richardson 1995, 145; Haigh 1996, 6.10-8; Knill 1997a). 
Considering the Information Directive, administrative changes occurred which 
in part go even beyond the European requirements. While the Directive 
provides only a passive right of information on request, the British rule grants 
an active right of access to information. Most important in this respect are the 
so-called public registers, which contain all data (including application, 
authorisation, prosecutions, infringements, emission data) relevant to the 
authorisation and operation of industrial plants (Knill 1995; 1997a). In general, 
the objectives of the Information Directives are achieved, an aspect which 
seems to be rather surprising in light of the former secretive practice.
In summary, this section revealed that our initial hypothesis, suggesting that 
implementation effectiveness depends on the level of correspondence between 
national regulatory patterns and those implied in the EU legislation, is not 
sufficient to explain German and British implementation performance with 
respect to the five environmental policies analysed in this working paper. While 
we find three of our five "matching cases" in Germany; in the UK only the 
implementation of the Eco-Audit Regulation corresponds to our initial 
expectations. Csidering this obviously limited explanatory value of 
"objective" factors constituting the basis for the implementation process, we 
will now introduce a "subjective" dimension to our analysis: We assume that the 
perceived adaptation pressure may vary from the adaptation pressure that was 
inferred from objective criteria and hypothesise that perception is ultimately 




























































































2 Perception of Adaptation Pressure: The Impact of Institutional 
Embeddedness and Policy Context
By introducing a subjective dimension in the analysis we account for the role of 
policy actors in the implementation process. Rather than assuming that the 
national regulatory arrangements can be taken in their aggregate - with their 
elements equally weighed - in order to infer the adaptation pressure, we argue 
that the distance between EU and national patterns and the malleability of 
national arrangements is defined subjectively by policy actors involved in the 
implementation process. These actors perceive their task within a frame of 
reference established by their institutional environment and their role-specific 
interests defined by and pursued in this context (Hall 1986, Thelen/Steinmo 
1992). Hence, a particular adaptation challenge may be perceived as more or 
less severe depending on the range of options provided by the institutional 
structure which may be factual (e.g., legal and procedural veto points) or 
conceptual (range of policy ideas circulating in the institutional context). We 
suggest that the potential for highly perceived adaptation pressure rises with the 
level of institutional embeddedness of the existing regulatory arrangements.
The institutional perception filter allows for the distinction of administrative 
core patterns (where embeddedness is high) and more peripheral arrangements 
in the eyes of the implementor (where embeddedness is low). Embeddedness is 
defined by institutional depth; i.e., the extent to which administrative 
arrangements are ideologically rooted in paradigms (Hall 1993) affecting the 
beliefs and ideas of administrative actors and institutional breadth, referring to 
the number and strength of inter- and intra-institutional links that need to be 
broken or re-routed in order to comply with EU legislative requirements 
(Krasner 1988).
Implementation problems are likely to arise if the implementation requirements 
imply the change of regulatory patterns perceived as core features by the 
relevant policy actors. If implementation involves some adaptation but is 
thought doable within the context of the regulatory core, we speak of moderate 
adaptation pressure. In such more open institutional environment we expect 
generally a high chance for successful implementation but also some 
vulnerability to temporary effects of the policy context. A favourable policy 
context (high policy salience and a consensual climate) will support policy 
reform (within the core), while a negative policy context (low salience or a 
conflictual climate) may result in a failure to act upon the moderate adaptation 




























































































context performs as a second(ary) perception filter, operating within the 
constraints created by the institutional filter2.
Turning to our empirical cases, we are now capable of supporting the 
conclusions derived from our previous analysis of the four "no-surprises" with a 
more sophisticated institutional analysis. More importantly, we are now able to 
account for the surprisingly effective implementation of the EMAS Regulation 
in Germany, the surprisingly cumbersome - though in the end successful - 
implementation of the Drinking Water Directive in Germany, and the 
surprisingly unsatisfactory implementation of the EIA Directive in Britain.
2.1 High Level of Institutional Embeddedness in the Two "Matching Cases" 
with Effective Implementation
In Germany we did not expect implementation problems in the case of the Large 
Combustion Plant (LCP) Directive as it corresponded with the national 
regulatory approach (precautionary, technology based, emission-based with 
respect to air pollution) and its interventionist regulatory style, legally imposing 
uniform, substantive standards. The UK, in turn, was expected to do well in the 
context of the EMAS Regulation as it shared the British preference for 
procedural regulatory tools allowing for a high degree of flexibility (if not self­
regulation). Looking at the dimension of institutional embeddedness, we find 
that this explanatory layer further supports our expectation of effective 
implementation.
Implementing the LCP Directive in Germany
The LCP Directive was drafted on the basis of the German model 
0Grofifeuerungsanlagenverordnung, GFAVo). The German GFAVo is deeply 
embedded in a historically grown, sectoral regulatory regime, aside from 
corresponding to general features of the German state and legal tradition 
discussed in section one. The basic structure to combat air pollution by 
industrial plants in Germany was built already in the mid 1800s, when special 
trade offices (Gewerbeaufsichtsamter) were legally empowered to restrict the 
operation of industrial plants in the name of the public interest (Boehmer- 
Christiansen/Skea 1991: 160) and a hierarchical structure of federal laws and 
administrative directives built to guide the plant authorisation process. 
Following the 1959 Federal Air Purity Act (Luftreinhaltegesetz) which
2 The introduction of the policy context as an auxiliary factor in cases where institutional 
constellation provide no sufficient explanation follows the principle of ..decreasing levels of 
abstraction", which takes the institutional frame as analytical point o f departure and moves 




























































































established air quality standards and required the application of best available 
technology by targeted industries, the 1974 Federal Air Quality Protection Act 
(Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz, BImSchG) provided the statutory basis for the 
German Large Combustion Plant Regulation (GFAVo) of 1983. The BImSchG 
defines the principles upon which pollution control is to be based (e.g., 
precaution, BAT), allocates responsibilities and establishes the framework for 
authorisation procedures. The GFAVo applies to all combustion plants rated 
over 50 MW thermal and established strict emission limits for seven major 
pollutants or groups of pollutants.
Not surprisingly, the LCP Directive was complied with in Germany without 
involving changes to the domestic regulatory approach, style or structure. Had 
the EU Directive departed from the Germany model (implying national 
adjustments) we would have expected the perception of relatively high pressure, 
considering the strong embeddedness of the German air pollution regime. As it 
stands, Germany is struggling to meet its obligations only with respect to 
meeting EU reporting requirements. This is due to the absence of a national 
inspectorate (as in the UK) and the presence of the federal and sectorally 
fragmented system with diverse authorisation and monitoring structures and 
procedures. To the extent that we witness changes to Germany’s administrative 
structure that would streamline the collection and aggregation of data, this 
seems to occur in the context of general attempts to “trim the state” rather than 
in response to its reporting difficulty in the EU (Lenschow 1997).
Implementing the EMAS Regulation in Britain
The Eco-Audit Regulation matched the mediating regulatory style in Britain 
which could build on already established institutional structures (which needed 
to be created in Germany). With respect to the body necessary for the 
accreditation of verifiers, the UK could rely on an administrative structure 
already in place to implement the national environmental management system 
and the ISO 9000 quality management. While the national management system 
and standards did not yet have a long tradition in the UK, they were perceived 
as core administrative innovations standard since they correspond to the British 
preference for self-regulation and procedural rather than substantive 
requirements. The adoption of the EU Regulation took place at about the same 
time as the institutionalisation of the British system, using it as a reference point 
(Heritier/Knill/Mingers 1996). Before this background, the adaptations required 
by the EU Regulation were perceived as rather minimal as they demanded the 
introduction of additional elements to the existing environmental management 
system based on British Standard 7750 (which had been introduced in 1992) 




























































































British management system such additions did not pose any real challenge, even 
though they resulted in some confusion during the early implementation phase 
(Knill 1997a).
2.2 High Level of Institutional Embeddedness in the Two "Matching Cases" 
with Ineffective Implementation
The dimension of institutional embeddedness supports and further substantiates 
the "positively matching" cases; it similarly sheds some more light on 
Germany’s problems in implementing the EIA and the Information Directives. 
Conflicting regulatory structures, in the former case, and regulatory style proved 
too deeply embedded in the German political and sectoral structure as well as 
legal tradition to allow for easy adaptation.
Implementing the Access to Environmental Information Directive in Germany
The procedural style and implication of rather transparent patterns of interest 
intermediation implied in the Access to Environmental Information Directive 
goes deep in contradicting the German regulatory model in putting into question 
the state and legal traditions which define the role perception of the 
administration as well as the administrative "rules of the game".
Scherzberg argues that the German executive still perceives its position as that 
of a state power to be isolated from civil society and not being accountable to it 
(1994: 745). This state tradition, he argues, still shapes the traditional mentality 
of the German civil servant, perceiving him- or herself as a servant of the state 
and the law, rather than of the ordinary citizen.
The German legal tradition has built additional obstacles to an open information 
policy. First, “in Germany, access to official files has traditionally been 
restricted to persons whose individual substantive rights may be affected by an 
imminent administrative decision. The right to know is seen as an essential 
element... of the legal protection of the substantive rights and it is not designed 
to guarantee participation in public decision making” (Winter 1996: 81). 
Accordingly, the principle of “free” access to information exists in traditional 
German administrative law only with respect to parties involved in an 
administrative procedure and tends to be restricted to access to existing 
documents (Wegener 1993: 17). Secondly, under German constitutional law the 
protection of individual rights has achieved primacy over the facilitation of the 
well-being of society insofar as this implies an intrusion into individual privacy 
- hence, the wide interpretation of the Directive’s exemption clauses in 




























































































notions in the German state and legal tradition is ensured with the German law 
on administrative procedures (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) which specifies 
under what conditions information is provided to the public (c.f., Erichsen 
1992, Drucksache Deutscher Bundestag 12/7138, Lenschow 1997).1 *3
Implementing the EIA Directive in Germany
As mentioned above, the German federal as well as sectorally fragmented 
administrative structure hampers the implementation of the integrated and 
cross-media concept embodied in the Directive which presumes comprehensive, 
centralised (due to standardisation and the designation of a “lead agency”) and 
concentrated consent procedures and structures (Commission 1993: 101).4 In 
Germany “[administrative processing of a project is medium specific both 
vertically and horizontally, and consequently uncoordinated in either legal 
terms or in practical performance” (Pfeiffer 1991: 57, cited in 
Heritier/Knill/Mingers 1996: 297). This structural contradiction was felt 
particularly intensely in Germany due to the constitutional nature of its federal 
structure and the existence of well elaborated sectoral arrangements for 
authorising public or private plans or projects (Planfeststellungsverfahren, 
Genehmigungsverfahren). Especially in cases of project authorisations 
0Genehmigungsverfahren), the EIA is likely to be perceived as a superfluous 
procedure because the existing authorisation arrangement is embedded in an 
emission oriented regulatory framework which clearly established the 
conditions under which the authorisation is to be granted (though not focusing 
on cross-media emission flows).
Given the strong embeddedness of general and sector-specific regulatory 
features that were contradictory to the content of the EIA Directive, hence the 
high perception of and resistant attitude toward EU-imposed adaptation 
requirements, implementation problems in Germany were not surprising. The 
German government opted against structural reforms in order to reach 
compliance with the Directive and instead sought to integrate the EIA procedure
1 The implementation problems in Germany were not exclusively rooted in its contrasting 
regulatory tradition, however; ambiguities in the Directive and hence the failure to impose 
clear implementation standards on the national governments and administrations further 
contributed to deficient implementation (Lenschow 1997). Under these conditions reform-
minded actors currently hope for clarifying Court rulings that might increase the “objective”
adaptation pressure in Germany.
4 The integrated regulatory approach may not overlap but also does not contradict German 
traditions, hence it does not represent a challenge to the core on this dimension. Such core 





























































































into the relevant existing authorisation procedures. Due to the density of this 
regulatory structure, and the complex and slow legislative process in Germany, 
the period of this integration process exceeded the time permitted in the EU 
Directive for the transposition process,5 aside from defining the Directive 
narrowly in case where legal ambiguity allowed to do so. Even though the 
Commission anticipated that by “integrating the EIA, the shortcomings and 
structural deficiencies of the existing environmental legal system may become 
more obvious...[which] could lead to very far-reaching structural changes of 
the German administrative and legal system for environmental protection 
(Commission 1993: 7), such radical departure was resisted in Germany. The 
very cautious streamlining of horizontal and vertical structures that can be 
observed (on the level of several German states) takes place in the context of 
general attempts to slim the state (Lenschow 1997).
So far, we have provided some more depth to our explanation for the existing 
"matches" to our initial hypothesis concerning the effect of the "objective" 
distance between national and EU regulatory approaches, style and structures on 
implementation performance. In the following section we will turn to three 
cases that contradicted our initial hypothesis and, we suggest, can be explained 
by reference to the institutional and policy context perception filters.
2.3 The "Value-Added" of the Institutional and Policy Context Perception 
Filters for Explaining Mis-matches
In this section we suggest that the peculiarities in Germany’s implementation 
performance with respect to the Drinking Water can be understood by adopting 
the more differentiated concept of institutional embeddedness as perceived by 
policy actors in our analysis. It illuminates why Germany seemed to “over­
perceive” the factually existing adaptation pressure. Furthermore we argue that 
the surprises with regard to the German EMAS and the British EIA 
implementation can be explained by reference to the only moderate institutional 
embeddedness of the relevant regulatory arrangements at the national level. In 
Germany this contributed to the fact that the EU measure was accepted as a 
positive contribution to the existing regulatory core. In the UK, by contrast, the 
only moderately adaptation pressure was neglected. Both experiences show that 
in cases of moderate institutional embeddedness we need to consider the policy 
context as a second perception filter which may send the implementation path 
up or down in terms of effectiveness.
5 Instead of mid 1988, the German EIA law (Umweltvertraglichkeitsgesetz) was passed in 
early 1990 and statutory ordinances detailing the integration of the EIA in sectoral consent 




























































































Implementing the Drinking Water Directive in Germany
Similar to the LCP Directive, the EU Drinking Water Directive generally 
corresponds with the Germany regulatory approach and style, hence poses little 
“objective” adaptation pressure. The fact that Germany nevertheless perceived 
at least moderate pressure and had some compliance problems has to do with 
the interplay of regulatory ambiguities in the Directive’s design and the strong 
embeddedness and relatively dogmatic application of the German regulatory 
approach.
Despite considerable local diversity, the German drinking water administration 
corresponds to the hierarchical structure whereby the local water providers 
(Wasserversorgungsunternehmen) are locked in a clearly defined and regulated 
chain of command and control, bridging all levels in the federal structure. Some 
deficiencies in actual coordination across levels of governance (cf. 
Wessels/Rometsch 1996) are balanced by a deeply rooted sense of 
responsibility to the consumers on the part of the water providers6 and related, 
the strong embeddedness of the precautionary and technology-oriented 
regulatory approach. The extent of this embeddedness became visible in 
Germany’s implementation performance.
Despite the parallels in EU and German regulatory approach and style, Germany 
formally transposed the Directive with considerable delay in 1986; the pesticide 
parameters were included only in 1989 and then incompletely; the final 
transposition of the legislation took place in late 1990. This delay was due 
primarily to German attempts to follow its regulatory approach (most notably 
with respect to BAT) within the framework of the EU Directive which 
contained internal inconsistencies. These inconsistencies were rooted merely in 
the Directive’s design, hence they did not reflect conflicts of principle between 
Germany and the EU. In short, given the long preparation phase preceding the 
adoption of the Directive, the measurement procedures imposed by it no longer 
corresponded to the “state of the art”, or BAT. Furthermore, they were found 
incapable of performing the fine measurements required to detect the small 
parameter values called for in the Directive. While other member states 
transposed and implemented the Directive even though they were quite 
incapable of measuring whether they were in compliance with the set quality 
standards, Germany delayed the transformation until it could ensure adequate 
measuring procedures. In other words, due to the deep embeddedness of the its
6 An interview partner at the Federal Association for German Gas and Water Providers 
(Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft e.V.) spoke of a “social contract” 




























































































regulatory approach Germany refused to transpose inconsistent legislation even 
though its implementation would not have caused any concrete adaptation 
pressure. As a side-effect of its - from the perspective of the requirements of the 
Directive - slightly exaggerated sense of responsibility and regulatory 
dogmatism Germany drastically raised the potential of detecting substantive 
compliance failures with the Directive.
Accepted Adaptation: Implementing EMAS in Germany
As suggested above, the emergence of Germany as the “European champion” in 
implementing EMAS surprises in light of the contrasting regulatory styles. It 
may be argued that EMAS has been implemented well because the contradiction 
to the German administrative tradition is limited to the dimension of regulatory 
style, while no core contradictions exist with respect to approach and structure. 
In terms of the regulatory approach the EMAS Regulation offers an operational 
framework to implement the otherwise elusive prevention principle, formulated 
already in Germany’s first environment programme. With its requirement for 
continuous improvement as part of the environmental management system the 
scheme supports the progressive approach to environmental protection implied 
in Germany’s traditional insistence to employ best available technology 
(Bundesministerium fur Umwelt 1994: xi), even though technological progress 
is pushed through management oriented means as opposed to command-control 
insistence of BAT. With respect to regulatory structure, the EMAS scheme 
required institutional innovation (establishing structures for EMAS 
accreditation and control) but no reformation, hence did not challenge any core 
institutional features.
Analytically, we must note however that neither the Access to Environmental 
Information Directive nor the EIA Directive implied core contradictions with 
respect to the regulatory approach and only the Environmental Impact 
Assessment challenged core features of the German regulatory structure. What 
distinguishes EMAS from the Information Directive? What does the concept of 
perceived institutional embeddedness contribute to solving this puzzle? To 
begin with, while the Access to Environmental Information Directive implies 
the substitution of a stylistic feature (restrictive access to third parties) with 
another (transparency), no substitution is called for in the EMAS Regulation. 
This voluntary tool for self-regulation is added to the persisting regulatory 
framework; the Regulation did not require any changes to already existing, 




























































































only “changes within” rather than of the core,7 implying that German policy 
actors felt less inclined to protect core principles against European intrusion
Secondly, the target group with respect to adaptation differs between the three 
pieces of procedural legislation discussed. While both the Information and the 
EIA Directive affect the legal and the administrative process, the EMAS 
Regulation does not call for adjustments of administrative behaviour and 
procedures. Considering the relative distance from and minimal demand on the 
established administration, there is no reason to expect intensive opposition on 
that level (i.e., sabotaging the practical implementation of the Regulation). In 
other words, the most likely sources for resistant implementation was the 
political level (in the formal transposition phase) and the private sector 
(practical implementation). Here, the Regulation resonated with a policy context 
defined by concerns with deregulation and unburdening the state and 
bureaucracy. In this context it is currently discussed to what extent EMAS could 
play a role in accelerating the authorisation procedure for industrial plants; e.g. 
by granting regulatory relief to companies registered under EMAS, a process 
spuming the scheme’s acceptance by industrial actors.
To sum up, the surprisingly successful implementation of the EMAS Regulation 
in Germany was facilitated by a permissive institutional context. The 
adaptations implied in the EMAS scheme did not meet any severe legal or 
procedural “veto points” (Immergut 1992), but could be added to the existing 
regulatory arrangements. Hence, they were perceived as a moderate pressure. 
On the basis of this institutional foundation, a favourable policy context, 
already pointing at deregulation, supported the positive response on the 
legislative as well as industrial level.
Neglected Adaptation: EIA in Britain
In Britain we detected four cases in which our initial hypothesis did not 
correspond to the actual implementation outcomes. While three cases exhibit 
surprisingly good implementation, the experience with the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Directive is disappointing considering its relative fit with 
British regulatory arrangements.
Similar to the German EMAS case, the implementation of the EIA Directive 
implied moderate implementation pressure in the UK. The EIA Directive leaves
7 While it can be argued that the stylistic features of the EIA Directive similarly only 
complemented rather than substituted patterns already in existence with respect to Germany 





























































































the member states considerable discretion on the detailed transposition into 
national legislation. Such national foundation existed in the British case already 
since the 1970s, albeit on a legally non-binding and relatively unsystematic 
basis. Nevertheless, the EU Directive came close to the British example where 
"... the developer already had to supply certain information; the public already 
had the chance to comment; the planning authority already went through a 
mental process in arriving at a decision which involves considering the 
information supplied by the developer and other; and when decisions was taken 
it was published" (Haigh 1996: 11.2-14). The Directive departed from British 
practice only in requiring slightly more formal procedures and centralised 
coordination.
Given the open wording of the Directive and the flexible British provisions, 
European requirements were merely integrated into the planning procedures 
which fall under the responsibility of the local authorities. This integration 
without change runs against the objectives of the Directive, however (see 
above). Looking at the empirical evidence, we find that the relevant policy 
actors did not perceive any adaptation pressure due to the EU Directive. In 
contrast to the German EMAS case, where the pressure to adapt regulatory 
practice within the core led to a willingly adaptation, in Britain the challenge of 
the EIA Directive, that after the institutional filter could be characterised as 
moderate, was perceived as low and the adaptation was insufficient. This “mis­
perception” can be explained by the political context.
The political context for passing and implementing environmental legislation 
was not supportive in the UK during the mid-1980s, that is during the time of 
the EIA implementation. Generally, the political influence of environmental 
organisations was low and environmental awareness of the general public 
relatively weak (cf. White-Grove 1992; Knill 1995). The few political access 
points for environmental policy entrepreneurs hindered effective mobilisation in 
this issue area. Furthermore, to the extent that we witnessed some issue salience 
and concern with environmental pollution this was focused on debate about 
S02 - a context where Britain had been proclaimed to be the “dirty man of 
Europe”. With respect to the rather “dull” EIA, which could not easily be linked 
to environmental disasters, there was no public pressure keeping the political 
level "honest" in implementing the Directive. A shift in policy salience took 
place only after the insufficient structure for implementing the EIA were already 





























































































In the previous part of our analysis we have specified our concept of 
“adaptation pressure” by combining the earlier introduced objective with a new 
subjective dimension. Adaptation pressure does not simply exist, but is 
perceived by the relevant policy actors who act - that is, implement EU 
legislation - on the basis of this perception. First, we have argued the perceived 
adaptation pressure depends on the level of the (perceived) institutional 
embeddedness of those features that need to be changed in order to comply with 
the respective EU legislation. Second, in two cases where the institutional filter 
left us with moderate adaptation pressure, we made reference to a second 
perception filter, namely the policy context, to determine the actually perceived 
pressure on the part of the policy actors, and hence their implementation 
performance.
To be concrete, the institutional perception filter allowed us to further support 
those cases, that already on the basis of objective criteria fit our expectations. 
Institutional embeddedness provided the additional, necessary clues to explain 
the peculiar implementation problems in the German Drinking Water case. On 
the basis of the institutional dimension we concluded moderate adaptation 
pressure with respect to the German EMAS and the British EIA case. The 
policy context helped us to explain why this moderate pressure was perceived in 
the German case as indeed moderate and hence manageable, whereas in Britain 
the EIA challenge was perceived as negligible and resulted in unsatisfactory 
implementation.
The reader will have noticed that three cases in the UK have not yet been 
explained (LCP, Drinking Water, Information Directive). A first glance at the 
institutional dimension seems to suggest that the contradiction between the 
national and the implied EU patterns are rather deep and the negative position 
taken by the British negotiators during the EU policy making process and even 
during initial stages of policy implementation indicate a clear perception of 
these differences (Heritier/Knill/Mingers 1996) 8. Nevertheless we experienced 
good implementation in these three cases. Do these cases undermine our 
institutionalist explanatory model? Considering the role of the policy context as 8
8 The British position given with respect to three Directives during the European policy 
making process differs to some extent. While British negotiator took a rather strong 
opposition in case of the LCP Directive, resistance in case of the Drinking Water Directive 
was modest, but drastically increased during the initial implementation stages. With respect to 
the Information Directive, on the other hand, Britain’s attitude shifted from opposing to 





























































































a perception filter above, can we rely entirely on this dimension in explaining 
our puzzles?
Certainly, with respect to the three still outstanding cases, we could argue that 
by the early 1990s, that is the period when Britain’s implementation 
performance improved, the general policy context had shifted in the UK. 
Margaret Thatcher had publicly endorsed an environmental agenda (Knill 1995) 
and the government taken a more proactive stands in combating environmental 
pollution and in shaping EU environmental legislation (Héritier/Knill/Mingers 
1996). However, if policy context alone was generally decisive we should not 
have seen any implementation problems in Germany. Considering the high 
political salience with respect to environmental issues in Germany, we can 
understand the poor implementation of the EIA and Information Directives only 
before the background of deeply embedded institutional structures challenged 
by the legislation. Hence, we will not yet discard our institutional model.
In the following section we will resolve the remaining puzzle by taking a closer 
look at the precise institutional framework conditions in Britain. In short, we 
will show that the surprisingly successful implementation of the LCP, Drinking 
Water and Information Directive in the 1990s took place after a “core shift” in 
Britain. On the basis of a new - and with regard to the Directives in question, 
more permissive - institutional framework the also more favourable policy 
context supported successful implementation, though the policy context was not 
sufficient by itself.
3 Perception of Adaptation Pressure: Institutional Embeddedness 
From a Dynamic Perspective
Examining closely the implementation process of the LCP, Drinking Water and 
Information Directive in Britain, we discover that the improvement occurred 
after far-reaching institutional reforms that also effected regulatory patterns in 
the environmental field. What used to be perceived as regulatory core features 
changed in this context of general reforms. From an analytical perspective this 
process indicates that our conception of institutional embeddedness as a static 
phenomena is inadequate to deal with the British case. We need to consider the 
structural stability of embeddedness, i.e. the ’’embeddedness of embeddedness”, 
since the institutional background, in which administrative arrangements are 
embedded, may itself be subject to dynamic developments. Their pace and 
scope are basically dependent on the structural capacity for reforms given at the 
national level. In other words, the institutional background, in which sectoral 




























































































which — depending on the reform capacity of the political system — more or 
less far-reaching developments may take place (cf. Dobbin 1994).
3.1 The “Moving” Core: National Dynamics
In contrast to Germany, the structural potential for dynamic developments of the 
institutional core is comparatively high in Britain. This capacity for initiating 
and implementing political reforms emerged as a result of the low number of 
institutional veto points and the strong position of the central government 
within the British political system. As Dunleavy writes, "Britain has ... the 
fewest formal or codified restrictions on government action of any liberal 
democracy. Governments [can] ignore public consultation, guillotine 
parliamentary debate, overrule unfavourable judicial rulings by retrospective 
legislation, and even bulldoze through patently unimplementable policies" 
(1993,5).
This structural potential for dynamic developments became particularly evident 
in the reform policies of the Conservative government, which had profound 
implications on British public administration. Reform developments initiated 
with respect to the public sector were linked to the basic objectives of 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness as well as reducing public sector 
involvement. To achieve these objectives, policies were directed at 
administrative reorganization, management reforms, and privatisation; with all 
of these elements putting potential challenges on existing administrative 
traditions.
To improve efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, structural and 
operational reforms occurred. The most important structural changes were 
introduced with "The Next Steps"-initiative. At the core of this initiative is the 
creation of semi-autonomous agencies responsible for operational management 
by separating management functions from policy-making functions which 
remain with the relevant departments. With respect to operational aspects, 
private sector management concepts and performance regimes were established. 
To drive public bodies toward a more efficient performance but also in order to 
create a substitute for the lack of democratic control of the independent 
agencies, there is tendency to make agency performance more transparent and 
accountable to the public. The Citizen’s Charter introduced in 1991 contains 
key objectives to improve the quality of public services, such as publishing 
explicit performance standards, complete information about running services, 
and effective remedies (Rhodes 1996, 9f.; cf. Hood 1991; Pollitt 1993; Knill 




























































































public utilities, such as the nationalised energy and water supply industries. 
This development coincided with the creation of regulatory regimes to control 
the market activities of the privatised utilities (Massey 1992, 494)9 10.
The dynamic developments at the national level imply important changes in 
administrative core patterns affecting regulatory style and structure. As result of 
the establishment of performance-oriented regimes and the creation of 
independent regulatory bodies, there has been a tendency toward more formal, 
legalistic and open patterns of administrative interest intermediation, 
contrasting the former patterns of informal, pragmatic, and secretive 
interactions. These patterns are also a result of changes in intra-administrative 
relations. Thus, the relation between agencies and their sponsoring department 
are defined in formal contract-like documents. Moreover, the establishment of 
independent agencies implies a formalisation of intra-administrative 
coordination. Such formalisation of intra-administrative coordination, in turn, 
may reduce the leeway for informal interaction between administrative and 
private actors, at least in cases where the latter are subject to regulation by 
different agencies; i.e. economic and environmental regulation. In addition, 
both privatisation and agencification have far-reaching structural implications, 
leading to a “trimmed down” but increasingly fragmented public sector (Rhodes 
1996; Wallace 1996)'°
3.2 Accepted Adaptations Within a Changing Core
Given these dynamic developments, the requirements contained in the three 
Directives still in question were no longer perceived as contradicting highly 
embedded core arrangements, since the core itself was moving. In the case of 
the LCP and Drinking Water Directives, these dynamics led not only to the 
accepted adaptations of European requirements within the moving core, but also 
for the persistence of those core elements not subject to national dynamics. This
9 The creation of independent regulators was unavoidable, given the fact that in order to attract 
private investors, public utilities were often privatised as a whole, thus implying the 
transformation of a public monopoly into a private monopoly (Massey 1992).
10 In the context of this agencification, in 1996 the Environment Agency was established 
(Weale 1996). The creation of the Agency brought together Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Pollution (HMIP), which was in charge of the control of industrial pollution, radiochemicals 
and hazardous waste, the National Rivers Authority (NRA) which had responsibility for the 
control of discharges into water, and 83 waste disposal authorities which so far were part of 
the local authorities. Control of drinking water quality, however, lies with a separate body, the 
Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), which is part of the DoE. Both the tasks of the NRA, 
which established in 1989, and the Drinking Water Inspectorate, which was created in 1990, 
imply a separation of regulatory functions from the function of water supply which up to 1989 




























































































outcome confirms our general hypothesis that implementation performance 
depends on the nature of perceived (dynamic) core arrangements.
LCP and Drinking Water
As we have indicated, both the LCP and Drinking Water Directive stood in 
sharp contrast to the traditional regulatory approach and the mediating 
regulatory style given in the UK. Interestingly, adaptation, once it took place, 
was limited to the latter dimension, leaving the former basically unchanged. In 
terms of the regulatory style, state intervention moved towards a more 
substantive orientation with numerical objectives to be achieved. In the LCP 
case, this becomes basically evident by the establishment of a so-called national 
plan, which defines annual reduction targets required by the Directive. In 
issuing authorisations for large combustion plants, regulatory authorities make 
sure that these targets are fulfilled. With respect to the Drinking Water 
Directive, the former principle of wholesomeness was abolished in favour of the 
legally-binding quality standards.
While these changes represent adaptations on the level of regulatory style, a 
closer look reveals that certain traditional elements characterising state 
intervention remain in place, indicating a degree of persistence along with 
adaptation. Thus, within the context of a more substantive orientation, there is 
still much room for flexible procedures11. In the LCP case, flexibility is 
achieved by the concept of so-called ’’company-bubbles”; i.e. a total of yearly 
maximum emissions. Companies are allowed to allocate emissions with respect 
to their different plants as long as emissions for each plant remain within a 
certain margin that is defined by the Environment Agency in light of local 
environmental conditions (Knill 1997a). With respect to drinking water, flexible 
handling is mainly achieved by the concept of legal undertakings which water 
suppliers could submit to the regulatory authority in the case of a breach of 
standards. The undertakings offer the opportunity for a more flexible approach 
within the general framework of quality objectives by establishing the necessary 
improvements the operator has to achieve within a given period of time, in light 
of the local situation (the quality of the water source) and practicability (in the 
light of available technology and upholding water supply) (Knill 1997a). As for 
the instruments in air pollution control, however, it is important to note that, 
despite the flexibility and discretion characterising implementation in the UK,.
11 The emphasis o f regulatory flexibility becomes also obvious in the introduction of 
Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) by the Environmental Protection Act 1990. According to 
this principle, emissions from industrial have to be reduced in light of the Best Practicable 
Environmental Option (BPEO), which takes a cross-media perspective. BPEO, however, is 




























































































the legally-binding objectives introduced by EU legislation provide the crucial 
substantive objective guiding on regulatory activity.
The co-existence of change and persistence in policy instruments is also 
reflected in the dominant patterns of interest intermediation. On the one hand, 
change is reflected in more formal and legalistic patterns as the set substantive 
objectives leave less room for ’’cosy” and pragmatic bargaining between 
regulatory authorities and industry (Jordan 1993; Knill 1995). On the other 
hand, the continuing quite flexible character of the policy instruments, e.g. in 
terms of taking account of local circumstances, allows for informal and 
pragmatic patterns to continue to some extent (Knill 1997a). In the latter 
context regulatory authorities still see their basic function in "helping industry 
to meet the standards" (Interviews Environment Agency; DWI, Feb. 1997).
The mixture of administrative change and persistence observed in the 
implementation of the LCP and Drinking Water Directives can only be 
understood against the background of a coincidence of national dynamics and 
European implementation pressure. With national tendencies moving toward 
more formal and legalistic patterns of interest intermediation, the European 
requirements pointing in the same direction were no longer perceived as 
challenges to existing core patterns, but as requiring changes within a changing 
core. We suggest that EU legislation reinforced the impact of general 
institutional dynamics in the environmental policy field by offering a concrete 
adaptation agenda; this agenda would have continued to be opposed without the 
changing general institutional context, however.
National reform dynamics indirectly facilitated the persistence of some 
regulatory features in creating new structures that minimised that factual 
problems Britain had to tackle with respect to air and water pollution; 
consequently Britain was able to comply with EU requirements without a 
complete overhaul of its practices. To be concrete, privatisation and 
deregulation in the energy sector allowed for the continuation of flexible 
practices as they led to a decrease in the use of national high-sulphur coal 
(reducing the pollution level) and to the emergence of company fuel portfolios, 
consisting of a broad mix of plant types using different fuels. Aside from easy 
adaptation to changing fuel prices, these portfolios allow for a moderation of 
the technological innovation pressure otherwise implied in the emission 
standards defined in the LCP Directive. Flexibility to achieve these standards 
increased, since besides installing expensive abatement technologies into 
existing coal-fired plants, the market-driven development of other plant types 
using different fuels allows for achieving the standards without making use of 




























































































privatisation and liberalisation led to the introduction of the "company-bubble" 
concept which provided a framework for more flexible regulatory practices. 
Partly protecting companies from the risks involved in highly unstable plant 
utilisation rates and fuel prices, the concept allowed that emission levels, 
defined on the basis of best available technology, could be exceeded up to a 
certain level defined in light of local quality, as long as the emission total 
remains within the "bubble" (Knill 1997a).
Flexibility could also persist in the case of water due to the special 
characteristics of the national reform dynamics. In the context of water 
management, where so far no competition was introduced, flexibility is less a 
consequence of market characteristics, but was seen as necessary prerequisite 
for successful privatisation. To attract private investors, government had to 
avoid economic uncertainties stemming from potential infringement 
proceedings initiated by the Commission. To secure a sufficient degree of 
certainty, the undertaking procedure was introduced, which provides for 
regulatory flexibility in the context of a substantive framework (Knill 1997a).
Access to Information
In the case of the Directive on Access to Information, national dynamic 
developments resulted in administrative changes that went partly even beyond 
European provisions. In the context of general attempts to increase transparency 
and accountability of the public sector, the Environmental Protection Act of 
1990 established so-called public registers, containing all relevant permitting 
and operational data as well as the results of emission monitoring for all 
processes falling under the Act. These arrangements exceed the requirements of 
the EU Directive which provides only a passive right of information on request, 
whereas the British rule grants an active right of access to information. The 
Directive applies to all environmental data, however, while the public registers 
cover only certain data pertinent to authorisation procedure. In so far, certain 
legal adaptations were still necessary in the UK, but in the new national context 
perceived as only a moderate and acceptable challenge.
The impact of the changed institutional environment on the implementation of 
the Information Directive can be inferred from previous domestic occurrences. 
Since the mid 1970s did the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP)12 urge for the adoption of more transparent environmental information 
and reporting practices in Britain (RCEP 1976, 1984) but was ignored in a
12 The RCEP is an independent standing body advising Queen, Parliament and the public on 




























































































national context still characterised by a secretive regulatory style. Similar 
resistance we would have expected had a EU Directive required more open 
practices. Administrative change became possible due to the reduced adaptation 
pressure perceived in the context of a dynamic regulatory core in Britain, 
moving toward accountability and opening-up government. As a first step, these 
general dynamics created a more favourable institutional framework for 
domestic environmental policy entrepreneurs to voice their demands. As already 
indicated, in particular the RCEP pushed for more transparency and in its tenth 
report in 1984 recommended ”a presumption in favour of unrestricted access” 
(Haigh 1996, 11.5-3). Furthermore, the persistent and growing activities of 
environmental organisations and the Campaign for the Freedom of Information 
(CFI) gradually modified the government’s receptiveness for action (Knill 
1997a). In other words, policy context factors began to operate in a modified 
institutional frame and served to change the perception of the EU adaptation 
challenge positively.
It should be noted, however, that national dynamic developments reduced the 
perception of pressure to adapt to EU requirements not only by moving toward 
more administrative openness, but also through - unintended - side-effects 
restricting the Directive’s application. As a consequence of privatisation, both 
the privatised water companies and electricity generators could classified 
themselves as not falling within the scope of the Directive, although they would 
have had this status as former publicly owned utilities13 (House of Lords 1996, 
para. 57). The scope of the Directive is also reduced by the increasing 
fragmentation and separation of regulatory functions, which is a consequence of 
agencification (Rhodes 1996). This situation means that demand for co­
ordination between different bodies significantly increased. In many cases, 
communications between different regulatory bodies have been declared as 
internal and therefore falling under the exemptions of disclosure (House of 
Lords 1996, para. 63). Besides these problems, however, the implementation of 
the Directive can generally be characterised as being rather effective.
In sum, the implementation of the three policies under study resonated with 
national reform dynamics. These developments, whose high scope and pace can 
be traced to the strong position of the government within the British political 
system, affected core patterns of the general institutional context, in which 
sectoral arrangements were embedded. Especially in the presence of an also 
favourable policy context, European requirements were no longer perceived as
13 The claim by the water service companies not to be within the scope of the Directive is 
currently subject of a formal complaint by CFI and FoE to the EU Commission, which has 




























































































contradicting administrative core arrangements, since this core — at least those 
parts which were defined by the general institutional context — was already 
subject to transformation. European provisions therefore were perceived as 
changes within a changing core and played an important role in guiding and 
reinforcing national reform dynamics.
Conclusion: Four Implementation Paths
Our case studies suggest that the impact of national administrative arrangements 
on the implementation of European policies depends on the perception of 
adaptation pressure on the national level. The extent to which such pressure is 
perceived is affected not only by the ’’objective” conflict between of national 
traditions and the requirements implied in supranational policies, but also by the 
operation of institutional and policy-specific ’’perception filters”. These play an 
important role in defining whether factual adaptation requirements are 
perceived as more or less fundamental.
To classify our findings, we will now distinguish between three levels of 
adaptation pressure depending on the degree of institutional embeddedness of 
sectoral administrative arrangements. We call the pressure high, if EU policy is 
perceived as contradicting core - that is, highly embedded - elements of 
administrative arrangements. Policy actors perceive moderate adaptation 
requirements if EU legislation is interpreted as demanding only changes “within 
the core” of national administrative traditions rather than challenging these core 
factors themselves. The addition of new regulatory elements that do not call for 
the replacement of existing arrangements signifies such change within the core. 
Furthermore, national dynamic processes resulting in a core shift may create a 
situation where adaptation requirements that would have been previously 
considered a core challenges are now perceived as acceptable reforms “within a 
moved core”. In contrast to instances of moderate and high adaptation pressure 
which both imply substantial administrative changes, member states perceive 
low pressure for adaptation if they assume that they can rely on already existing 
administrative provisions to implement European legislation.
In a second step of our analysis, we argue that the institutional constellation, 
defined by the degree of embeddedness of existing administrative arrangements, 
determines the framework within which the policy context affects the 
implementation process. While the policy context provides little additional 
explanatory value in cases of either high or low institutional embeddedness, our 
empirical analysis suggests that moderate adaptation pressure - as perceived 




























































































of political salience and the consensual or conflictual attitude linked to the 
legislation in question. The institutional and contextual perception filters open 
the doors to four different ’’implementation paths” that will be described in the 
following concluding sections of this working paper.
Contradiction o f the Core
(1) Resistant Persistence
In cases where contradictions of the administrative core and hence high 
adaptation pressure are perceived, ineffective implementation results are likely. 
As neo-institutionalist approaches suggest, well-established institutions and 
traditions not easily adapt to exogenous pressures. Apart from the rare cases of 
external shocks or fundamental performance crises, institutions remain stable 
even in a changing environment (cf. Krasner 1988; DiMaggio/Powell 1991; 
March/Olsen 1996). Such persistence is particularly apparent with respect to 
core elements, which are deeply rooted in the institutional framework. 
Adaptation pressure by European legislation targeted at such core elements can 
be expected to be resisted. Incomplete, incorrect, or symbolic implementation 
may barely result in formal compliance, but practical implementation is 
expected to follow the pre-existing approach, failing to meet EU standards (cf 
Brunsson/Olsen 1993).
The pattern of resistant persistence became particularly evident with respect to 
the implementation of Directives on EIA and Access to Information in 
Germany. Implementation turned out to be rather ineffective as a result of 
refused or incomplete adaptation of institutionally strongly embedded 
administrative arrangements contradicting European requirements.
Change Within a (Changing) Core
Moderate adaptation pressure implies that the changes required are interpreted 
as remaining within the institutional framework not challenging its core. Actual 
adaptation may require substantial but no “fundamental” reforms. If the 
“institutional filter” results in such relatively open situation for the 
implementation actors, we find that adaptability depends on the given policy 
context which may change the perception of the challenge. Depending on the 





























































































If the institutionally defined perception of adaptation requirements is moderate 
and supported by a “favourable” policy context we expect accepted adaptation. 
A favourable policy context implies that there is some degree of political 
salience regarding the problem tackled by the respective EU legislation and a 
political commitment at the national level pointing in the same direction as the 
EU legislation, i.e. a consensual political climate.
We observed such positive impact by the policy context with respect to both a 
static and a dynamic core. The former case is illustrated by the implementation 
of the EMAS Regulation in Germany where the new regulatory elements were 
quite enthusiastically added to existing arrangements as they corresponded with 
a political commitment to experiment with deregulatory measures. In Britain the 
changing general institutional core reduced the initially high adaptation 
pressure felt with respect to the Directives on LCP, Drinking Water and Access 
to Information. A favourable policy context facilitated that general national 
dynamics were applied to policy specific administrative reforms and allowed for 
the fact that supranational policies were used to drive these changes further than 
they would have otherwise gone.
(3) Neglected Adaptation: Missing Contradiction or Missing Capacity
Within a less favourable policy context, moderate adaptation requirements 
indicated by the institutional perception filter" may be (mis)perceived as low, 
leading to ineffective implementation results. For instance, the implementation 
of the EIA Directive in Britain suffered from low political salience and the 
consequent shift from moderate to low pressure perception. In other words, the 
combination of the two perception filters led to a situation where the 
“objective” adaptation pressure implied in the Directive were either 
underestimated or intentionally ignored.
Empirical research conducted in Spain and Italy, that was not systematically 
included in the analysis of this working paper, suggests that a shift from 
moderate to low perception of adaptation pressure such situations is most likely 
in countries with low administrative capacity in environmental policy. In the 
absence of an elaborated and systematic regulatory and administrative 
framework and hence of a strongly embedded sectoral core, the institutional 
filter will rarely produce high adaptation pressure as EU requirement are likely 
to demand expansion rather than reform. Considering that such “low capacity” 
countries often suffer from low environmental issue salience and a lacking 




























































































feared, the factually existing adaptation pressure is not adequately perceived or 
ignored, implying ineffective implementation (cf. Knill 1997).
Theoretically, one could also think of cases where the policy context results in a 
perception shift from moderate to high. Under such circumstances, 
implementation performance corresponds to the first path of resistant 
persistence. The implementation of the Drinking Water Directive in France 
illustrates this case. Although only moderate changes were required from an 
institutional perspective (the definition of uniform limit values rather than 
regional standards given in France), the Directive was actually perceived as 
contradicting core arrangements. A highly conflictual policy context, pitting 
water companies against the French authorities, was responsible for this 
perception movement (cf. Bailey 1997, Knill 1997).
Confirmation o f the Core
(4) Compliant Persistence
If the constellation of European requirements and national administrative 
traditions imply no or only negligible adaptations of administrative 
arrangements EU policy is perceived as a confirmation of national core 
arrangements and implemented effectively. This holds especially true for 
constellations where national arrangements exactly reflect or even go beyond 
the supranational provisions, as it is the case with respect to the implementation 
of the LCP in Germany and the EMAS Regulation in Britain. Here, national 
administrative traditions allow for a rather effective implementation of 
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